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A POWER-WEIGHTED VARIANT OF THE
EU27 CAMBRIDGE COMPROMISE
G. R. GRIMMETT, K.-F. OELBERMANN, AND F. PUKELSHEIM
Abstract. The Cambridge Compromise composition of the European Par-
liament allocates five base seats to each Member State’s citizenry, and ap-
portions the remaining seats proportionately to population figures using the
divisor method with rounding upwards and observing a 96 seat capping.
The power-weighted variant avoids the capping step, proceeding instead by
a progressive non-linear downweighting of the population figures until the
largest State is allocated exactly 96 seats. The pertinent calculations of the
variant are described, and its relative constitutional merits are discussed.
1. Introduction
The Cambridge Compromise “5+Upw” is a mathematical formula to ap-
portion the 751 seats of the European Parliament (EP) among the 27 Mem-
ber States, [4]. It operates in two steps. In the first step, five base seats
are allocated to the citizenry of each Member State. In the second step, the
616 (= 751−27·5) remaining seats are apportioned in proportion to the States’
population figures1 p1, . . . , p27. The divisor method with rounding upwards se-
cures the minimum threshold of six seats per Member State. Seat contingents
are capped at 96 if need be, staying in line with Article 14 II of the Treaty
of Lisbon that decrees that no Member State shall be allocated less than 6 or
more than 96 seats, [9].
This note develops a power-weighted variant “5+Pwr+Upw” of the Cam-
bridge Compromise, in the spirit of [1, 10]. The variant refers the appor-
tionment of the 616 remaining seats to power-weighted population indices pEi ,
rather than to the original population figures pi. When necessary, an exponent
E < 1 is calculated in order that the contingent of the largest Member State
be reduced to exactly 96 seats.
It is shown in Section 2 that, for a given apportionment vector
x = (x1, . . . , x27), the exponent E ranges across an interval [Emin(x), Emax(x)]
without alteration to x. We describe in Section 3 how to determine an ex-
ponent E that secures 96 seats for the largest State. Section 4 contains a
Date: July 25, 2011.
1We find it useful to sort populations from largest to smallest. Thus p1 refers to the
largest Member State (at present, Germany), and p27 to the smallest (at present, Malta).
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discussion of the merits of the variant from the viewpoint of general electoral
principles, and of the requirements of the Union’s primary law.
The power-weighted variant stays closer to the status quo composition of the
EP than do (at least) many of the other methods reviewed in [4]. It affords
a possible transition from the present composition to the eventual Cambridge
Compromise “5+Upw” across an enlarged Union, and it satisfies the amended
definition of degressive proportionality of [4]. On the other hand, the use of
power-weighted population indices entails a lack of transparency, and consti-
tutes a breach of the principle of equal voting power.
2. Exponent-ranges
Suppose the seat vector x originates from population indices that are weighted
with some given exponent E > 0. Since the exponent is a continuous variable
while the seat contingents are integer-valued, there exists a range of values of E
across which the seat vector x is constant. In this section, we investigate the
induced exponent-range [Emin(x), Emax(x)]. The allocation of base seats plays
no role in this investigation, and will therefore be neglected in this section.
Similarly, we shall take no account of the 96-seat cap in this section.
The seats to be apportioned are the 616 remaining seats. Let y = y(E) be
a seat apportionment vector generated with a given exponent E > 0. The
components yi are obtained from the population indices p
E
i via scaling with a
common divisor D > 0 and rounding the resulting quotients upwards, where
the divisor is chosen so that the sum of the components exhausts the seats
available:
yi =
⌈
pEi
D
⌉
for i = 1, . . . , 27,
27∑
i=1
yi = 616.
For a given y, the exponent-range [Emin(y), Emax(y)] is calculated as follows.
We need consider only seat vectors y with yi ≥ 1 for all i. Consider two
States indexed i and j. There exists a unique critical exponent E(i, j), depend-
ing on y, such that, when E = E(i, j), the allocations (yi, yj) and (yi+1, yj−1)
are equally justified. Only situations with yj ≥ 2 are relevant in order to make
sure that yj−1 ≥ 1 plus five base seats achieve the six seat minimum required
by the Treaty of Lisbon.
The tie entails the identities
p
E(i,j)
i
D
= yi and
p
E(i,j)
j
D
= yj − 1.
In view of the rule of rounding upwards, this indicates that State i may be
allocated yi or yi + 1 seats, and that State j is eligible for yj − 1 or yj seats.
The identities allow us to eliminate the divisor and to solve thus for the critical
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exponent,
E(i, j) =
log (yi/(yj − 1))
log (pi/pj)
.
As E increases, the seat vector y is unchanged until E attains the value
Emax(y) = min {E(i, j) : pi > pj, yj ≥ 2} .
By a similar argument as E decreases, the lower boundary point of the exponent-
range is
Emin(y) = max {E(i, j) : pi < pj, yj ≥ 2} .
The exponent-range for y is found to be [Emin(y), Emax(y)]. This range neces-
sarily contains the given exponent E used to generate the seat vector y.
For example, consider the case of unweighted population figures, E = 1.
The seat numbers xi(1) = 5 + yi(1) are exhibited in the penultimate column
of Table 1. It transpires that y(E) = y(1) is unchanged as E ranges from
Emin
(
y(1)
)
= 0.9956 to Emax
(
y(1)
)
= 1.0010. The “nicest” value in this
exponent-range is evidently E = 1.
For a general compact interval [Emin, Emax], we may pick a “nice” represen-
tative exponent E by rounding the midpoint of the interval to as few significant
digits as the interval permits. The smallest and greatest intervals are half-open,
however. In these two intervals, we may choose a representative exponent near
the closed boundary, in order to avoid numerical difficulties.
The transfer argument proves also that, if E < E ′, the seat vector y(E) is
majorized2 by the seat vector y(E ′). In particular, the largest State i = 1 has
seat numbers that are nondecreasing in E, that is E < E ′ ⇒ y1(E) ≤ y1(E ′).
We have that y1(0.01) = 28 − 5 = 23 and y1(27.5) = 595 − 5 = 590, see
Table 1. Hence, the equation y1(E) = 91 is solvable for E. We consider the
determination of a solution in the next section.
3. Choice of initial exponent
We may determine an exponent E with y1(E) = 91 in the following algorith-
mic manner. As starting point, we may expect the ideal share of the largest
State to be close to its target contingent of 91 seats,
pE1∑27
i=1 p
E
i
· 616 = 91.
This equation may be solved numerically, and yields (with the 1.1.2011 Eu-
rostat population figures) an initial exponent Einit = 0.8888. The largest
State i = 1 misses its target by a single seat, y1(0.8888) = 90. The induced
2The property of majorization amounts to the fact that, for any k, the aggregate number
of seats of the k largest States is nondecreasing. As a consequence, the aggregate number
of seats of the 27− k smallest States is nonincreasing. See [6] for more details.
4 GRIMMETT, OELBERMANN, AND PUKELSHEIM
exponent-range turns out to be [0.8884, 0.8977], with “nice” exponent 0.893.
The machinery of Section 2 yields the next seat vector y(0.899), with exponent-
range [0.8978, 8998], which still fails to allocate 91 seats to the largest State.
One further iteration yields an exponent 0.9 ∈ [0.8999, 0.9035] with which the
discrepancy vanishes. See Table 1.
An improved initialization procedure is available. The divisor method with
rounding upwards is known to be biased, in that it has a tendency on average
to favour smaller States at the expense of larger States. The seat-bias of the
largest State may be approximated by the formula
−1
2
{(
27∑
n=1
1
n
)
− 1
}
= −1.4457,
see [5]. With this term included, the above initialization equation becomes
pE1∑27
i=1 p
E
i
· 616 = 91 + 1.4457,
with numerical solution Einit = 0.9055, and hence the “nice” exponent 0.91.
The ensuing seat vector y(0.91) achieves the target for the largest State,
y1(0.91) = 91, with exponent-range [0.9036, 0.9109]. Thus y(0.91) differs from
y(0.9).
We return now to the original setting in which each State receives in addition
five base seats, and we write xi = 5 + yi. If an exponent lies below 0.8999
or above 0.9109, the corresponding allocation fails to allocate to the largest
State its target contingent of 96 seats. The exponent-range [0.8999, 0.9035]
gives rise to the feasible seat vector x(0.9), and the subsequent exponent-
range [0.9036, 0.9109] yields the apportionment x(0.91). Thus we obtain two
apportionment vectors, x(0.9) and x(0.91), each of which allocates 96 seats to
the largest Member State. See3 Table 1.
We close this section with some comments based on the current and fore-
seeable population profile of the European Union.
1. There can exist several values of E for which the seat vector x(E) satisfies
x1(E) = 96. Of these, the smallest such exponent leads to the composition
closest to the status quo composition and, presumably, risks the greatest ac-
claim of the incumbent Parliament. Similarly, the composition with the largest
exponent comes closest to the principled approach of the Cambridge Compro-
mise. See Table 2.
3Exponent-ranges for E and applicable divisors D are:
Emin 0 0.8884 0.8978 0.8999 0.9036 0.9110 0.9956 27.2202
Exponent 0.01 0.893 0.899 0.9 0.91 0.912 1 28
Emax 0.0123 0.8977 0.8998 0.9035 0.9109 0.9125 1.0010 ∞
Divisor 0.0526 121 400 144 400 146 960 174 600 180 800 830 000 6.12 · 10218
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2. A composition based on an exponent satisfying E ≤ 1 automatically
satisfies the revised definition of degressive proportionality of [4]. Conversely,
when E > 1, the representation might possibly be called “progressive”.
3. The power-weighted variant is a smoother allocation in situations where
the Cambridge Compromise “5+Upw” hits the upper cap. Its implementation
is thus in two steps. First, calculate the CamCom apportionment. If this caps
the largest State at 96, then calculate the power-weighted variant.
4. As new States accede, the exponents E that achieve x1(E) = 96 approach
unity. When unity is reached, E = 1, the downweighting of population figures
becomes neutral, and the ensuing apportionment is that of the Cambridge
Compromise.
5. The identity 5+Upw = 5.5+Std = 6+Dwn ([11]) is invalid for non-linear
variants of the Cambridge Compromise including that considered here.
6. Serious issues of transparency and interpretation arise in the use of power-
weighted population indices. For example, in the composition with exponent
E = 0.9, the number of (non-base) seats allocated to Italy is in proportion to a
population index of 10 058 816.8 power-weighted “apportionment units”, rather
than to the Italian population 60 340 328. How should this be interpreted, or
explained to an Italian citizen? This problem does not arise in the linear case
when E = 1. In this case there is a divisor-value D = 830 000 with the clear
interpretation that every group of 830 000 Union citizens accounts for one seat
in Parliament (subject to rounding).
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Member State Population Exponent E for Power-Weighted Variant
(EU27) (1.1.2011) 0.01 0.893 0.899 0.9 0.91 0.912 1 27.5
Germany 81 802 257 28 95 95 *96 96 97 104 595
France 64 714 074 28 78 78 78 *79 79 83 6
UK 62 008 048 28 75 *76 76 76 76 80 6
Italy 60 340 328 28 74 74 74 74 74 78 6
Spain 45 989 016 28 59 59 59 59 59 61 6
Poland 38 167 329 28 51 51 51 51 51 51 6
Romania 21 462 186 28 33 33 *32 32 32 31 6
Netherlands 16 574 989 28 27 27 27 27 27 25 6
Greece 11 305 118 28 21 21 21 21 20 19 6
Belgium 10 839 905 28 20 20 20 20 20 19 6
Portugal 10 637 713 28 20 20 20 20 20 18 6
Czech Republic 10 506 813 28 20 20 20 20 20 18 6
Hungary 10 014 324 28 19 19 19 19 19 18 6
Sweden 9 340 682 28 18 18 18 18 18 17 6
Austria 8 375 290 28 17 17 17 17 17 16 6
Bulgaria 7 563 710 28 16 16 16 16 16 15 6
Denmark 5 534 738 28 14 *13 13 13 13 12 6
Slovakia 5 424 925 28 13 13 13 13 13 12 6
Finland 5 351 427 28 13 13 13 13 13 12 6
Ireland 4 467 854 28 12 12 12 12 12 11 6
Lithuania 3 329 039 28 11 11 11 *10 10 10 6
Latvia 2 248 374 28 9 9 9 9 9 8 6
Slovenia 2 046 976 27 9 9 9 9 9 8 6
Estonia 1 340 127 27 8 8 8 8 8 7 6
Cyprus 803 147 27 7 7 7 7 7 6 6
Luxembourg 502 066 27 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Malta 412 970 27 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Sum 501 103 425 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 751
Table 1. Power-weighted variant, below and beyond the 96-
seat restriction. When E = 0.01, seats are apportioned almost
equally. When E = 0.9 and E = 0.91, Germany is allocated 96
seats, stars * indicating intervening seat transfers. With E = 1,
population figures are unweighted. When E = 27.5, seats are
apportioned as unequally as possible.
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A B C D E
EU27 Population Popn0.91 Popn0.9 CC Par. x(0.91) x(0.9) Now
DE 81 802 257 15 871 442.9 13 227 834.7 96 96 96 96 99
FR 64 714 074 12 823 567.3 10 712 698.1 85 80 79 78 74
UK 62 008 048 12 334 675.7 10 308 684.6 81 78 76 76 73
IT 60 340 328 12 032 419.8 10 058 816.8 79 76 74 74 73
ES 45 989 016 9 397 563.0 7 877 505.3 62 61 59 59 54
PL 38 167 329 7 931 211.1 6 660 741.7 52 52 51 51 51
RO 21 462 186 4 697 029.6 3 967 405.2 32 33 32 32 33
NL 16 574 989 3 712 807.7 3 144 183.8 26 27 27 27 26
EL 11 305 118 2 621 080.4 2 228 166.2 19 20 21 21 22
BE 10 839 905 2 522 744.0 2 145 472.4 19 20 20 20 22
PT 10 637 713 2 479 887.2 2 109 421.9 18 19 20 20 22
CZ 10 506 813 2 452 102.5 2 086 046.1 18 19 20 20 22
HU 10 014 324 2 347 284.3 1 997 834.3 18 19 19 19 22
SE 9 340 682 2 203 152.3 1 876 466.1 17 18 18 18 20
AT 8 375 290 1 994 940.1 1 700 982.6 16 16 17 17 19
BG 7 563 710 1 818 229.6 1 551 891.6 15 15 16 16 18
DK 5 534 738 1 368 416.6 1 171 621.6 12 13 13 13 13
SK 5 424 925 1 343 687.6 1 150 679.5 12 13 13 13 13
FI 5 351 427 1 327 111.3 1 136 639.2 12 13 13 13 13
IE 4 467 854 1 126 134.0 966 249.0 11 11 12 12 12
LT 3 329 039 861 608.9 741 458.8 10 10 10 11 12
LV 2 248 374 602 837.7 520 812.9 8 8 9 9 9
SI 2 046 976 553 493.6 478 631.7 8 8 9 9 8
EE 1 340 127 376 446.1 326 912.4 7 7 8 8 6
CY 803 147 236 245.5 206 212.8 6 7 7 7 6
LU 502 066 154 060.9 135 109.1 6 6 6 6 6
MT 412 970 128 969.2 113 325.2 6 6 6 6 6
Sum 501 103 425 751 751 751 751 754
Table 2. Comparison of five EP compositions. Column A is
the Cambridge Compromise “5+Upw” of [4]. Column B is the
parabolic allotment of [8]. Columns C and D are power-weighted
variants, with exponents 0.91 and 0.9 respectively, and associ-
ated population indices as shown. Column E is the status quo.
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4. Discussion
The legal principles for the composition of and election to the European
Parliament (EP) may be found in Article 14 of the Treaty of Lisbon [9]:
(II 1) The EP shall be composed of representatives of the Union’s citizens.
They shall not exceed seven hundred and fifty in number, plus the
President. Representation of citizens shall be degressively proportional,
with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State. No
Member State shall be allocated more than ninety-six seats.
(III) The members of the EP shall be elected for a term of five years by
direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot.
The concept of “equality” appears in several other articles of the Treaty (in-
cluding Articles 2, 4, 9, 10), but is notably absent from Article 14.
Moreover, under the Treaty of Lisbon the task of deciding on the EP’s com-
position has become a matter for secondary (parliamentary) law, and therefore
subject to challenge in the Court of Justice of the European Union.
The European Commission for Democracy through Law [Venice Commis-
sion], an institution of the Council of Europe, lists in [2] five principles of
Europe’s electoral heritage:
(I) The five principles underlying Europe’s electoral heritage are universal,
equal, free, secret and direct suffrage.
The 27 Member States of the Union count among the 47 members of the
Council of Europe, and as such endorse the Venice Commission’s Code of
Good Practice in Electoral Matters. Furthermore, the Union has resolved to
accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedom, and will then become accountable to the European
Court of Human Rights.
The concept of electoral equality is not self-explanatory, but requires in-
terpretation. Constitutional courts take pains to distinguish between large
electorates (such as a national parliament), medium-size electorates (such as
a provincial legislature), and small electorates (as in local communities). The
European Union is on a scale in excess of these, and the notions of electoral
equality entertained within the 27 Member States cannot be extended auto-
matically to the entirety of the Union. The EP has thus substantial freedom
in specifying an interpretation of the concept of electoral equality.
The two-stage process of the Cambridge Compromise may be interpreted
as a type of “dual electoral equality”. This dual concept is a merger of the
one state, one vote rule of international law, and of the one person, one vote
principle of equal representation of citizens. There is a potential ambiguity in
the term “state” over whether it refers to government or to people. Our belief
that many Members of the EP consider themselves representatives of their
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citizenry is supported by the statement of Article 14 II that says just this. We
shall thus write here of “citizenries” rather than of “states”.
The Cambridge Compromise merges the two aspects of electoral equality,
and may be interpreted as follows. The base component is directed towards
equality of citizenries, and the proportional allocation of the remaining seats is
aimed at equality among Union citizens. In contrast, it is considerably harder
to justify the power-weighted variant of the Cambridge Compromise, since it
violates the principle of equal suffrage as set out by the Venice Commission:
(2.2) Equal voting power: seats must be evenly distributed between the con-
stituencies.
There seems little doubt in the context of the EP that the word “constituen-
cies” should be interpreted as “Member States”. Yet the power-weighted ap-
portionment is decidedly unequal4. For example, whereas the Italian population-
index accounts for just a sixth of its population, the Maltese index accounts
for one quarter.
A further principle of electoral affairs, the continuity principle, shields the
legislator from abstract rules in situations where more sensitive action is needed.
During a period of significant institutional development, the EP may adopt the
power-weighted variant 5+Pwr+Upw as a step along a continuous transition
from the negotiated status quo composition to the constitutionally principled
Cambridge Compromise. This variant honours the equality principle for cit-
izenries, and converges for an enlarged Union towards the equality principle
for individual citizens. The transitional period with E < 1 is justifiable by an
appeal to the principle of continuity.
The above discussion may be summarised as follows. While the power-
weighted variant of the Cambridge Compromise is technically sound and feasi-
ble, it is in conflict with the principle of equal voting power. Since the power-
weighting will diminish as the Union grows, this variant may be justified by
the continuity principle.
We close with a word of caution. The lack of transparency of the power-
weighted variant may be more harmful than helpful to public reception. The
current rapporteur Andrew Duff MEP has proposed an intermediate step of ne-
gotiation as a bridge between the status quo and the Cambridge Compromise.
This pragmatic proposal may be superior in communication and implementa-
tion.
4In the terminology of the German Federal Constitutional Court, equal voting power is
termed Za¨hlwertgleichheit.
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